Cognitive Grammar: A Global Perspective

Ronald W. Langacker
University of California, San Diego

Overview

(1) Central ideas

(a) **Integration:** Insofar as possible, language is viewed as resulting from other, more basic phenomena (as opposed to being distinct and autonomous).

(b) **Dynamicity:** Language is *organized activity* and thus occurs through time. Linguistic structure consists in *established patterns* of activity (**units**).

(c) **Usage based:** Linguistic units are abstracted from **usage events** (instances of language use, in all their complexity) and employed in subsequent events.

(d) **Interaction:** Language is learned and used in a social and discourse context. Consistent aspects of those contexts are retained by **conventional** units as part of their value.

(e) **Cognitive semantics:** Meaning resides in **conceptualization**, the experiential side of cognition. It is *embodied* and *interactive*, a primary means of engaging the world.

(f) **Function:** The **descriptive** and **interactive** functions of language give rise to more specific functions. Language structure is the *implementation* of functional organization.

(g) **Restrictiveness:** Only *semantic*, *phonological*, and *symbolic* units can be posited. They must occur in actual expressions or arise from them by *abstraction* and *categorization*.

(h) **Symbolic assemblies:** Lexicon and grammar form a continuum consisting in flexible, dynamic **assemblies of symbolic structures**. Grammar is inherently meaningful.

(i) **Unification:** The same basic notions apply to all aspects of language structure. Compatibility is expected with other fields of linguistic study and other disciplines.

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

(3)(a) In a symbolic relationship, either the form or the meaning serves to **activate** the other. The result is that both are momentarily active in a **window** of attention.

(b) The **interlocutors**—speaker (S) and hearer (H)—apprehend the expression (--->) and interact with one another (<--->). This constitutes the **ground** (G).

(c) The interaction takes place in a physical, social, cultural, and discourse **context**. There is no precise boundary between linguistic and contextual meaning (semantics and pragmatics), or between the context and relevant background knowledge.

(d) Usage events occur sequentially to form a coherent **discourse**. One facet of the relevant context is how the **current** usage event relates to both prior and subsequent ones.
(e) While the content in the current window is the **focus of attention**, everything in (2) falls within the **scope of awareness** and is part of the **substrate** supporting an expression.

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

(5)(a) **Individual axis:** It is individuals who acquire language, serve as the repository of language structure, and carry out linguistic activity (even when acting in concert).
(b) **Interactive axis:** The speaker and hearer interact with one another. Even when unexpressed, relationships along this axis are essential to semantics and grammar.
(c) **Descriptive axis:** This involves relationships between the interlocutors and the **objective scene** (the situation being described), accessed through windows of attention.
(d) **Discursive axis:** Along this axis are relationships among the successive usage events comprising a discourse. There is no definite boundary between discourse and grammar.

Usage

(6) A language is a set of **conventional linguistic units**—established patterns of activity standard in a speech community. They are learned through usage and guide later usage.

(7) Fundamental cognitive phenomena
(a) **Automatization:** An activity is rehearsed and mastered to the point that its execution is automatic. It undergoes *entrenchment*, becoming a *unit*, e.g. (obama) > [obama].
(b) **Abstraction:** The emergence of a unit through reinforcement of the features shared by multiple structures. Being limited to what they have in common, the resulting unit is **schematic** relative to these structures, i.e. characterized with less precision and detail. A schema is *immanent* in ("lies within") its instantiations, not a separate structure.

$$(CAT^1), (CAT^2), (CAT^3), (CAT^4) > [CAT]$$

(c) **Comparison:** Activating one structure, the **standard**, as the basis for assessing another, the **target**. In *categorization*, the standard is a unit while the target is novel. The target can either conform to the standard (S→T) or conflict with it in some way (S--->T).

Recognition: [CAT] → (CAT^5) Extension: [CAT] ---> (TIGER)

(d) **Combination:** Structures being combined into structures of greater complexity. In *association* they merely co-occur since one activates the other, e.g. in symbolization: [[CAT]/[cat]]. In *composition*, **component structures** undergo **conceptual integration** to form a **composite structure** that is more than just the sum of its parts.

Composition: ([*Obama*]-[*care*]) Entrenchment: [[*Obama*]-[*care*]]

(8)(a) An individual's linguistic ability comprises a **set of units**. These are dynamic, entrenched to varying degrees, and non-autonomous. They are internal but not insular.

(b) **Coding:** In a usage event, units are activated to categorize particular facets of the target expression. These categorizations constitute its *structural interpretation*.

(c) The expression is **well-formed** (conventional, "grammatical") to the extent that the categorizations involve recognition rather than extension.

(d) The **selection** of categorizing units depends on entrenchment, prior activation level, activation from associated elements, and extent of overlap with the target.

(e) Usage leads to **change**: existing units are either reinforced or decay, and new units arise through the repeated occurrence of combinations and extensions.

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

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

(11) Some units inherent in *the cat*

(a) Semantic: [DEFINITE], [CAT]

(b) Phonological: [ðə], [kæt], [ð], [ə], [k], [æ], [t], [CV], [CVC]

(c) Symbolic: [[DEFINITE]/[ðə]], [[CAT]/[kæt]], [[ARTICLE]-[NOUN]]

Interaction

(12)(a) **Intersubjectivity** presupposes **subjectivity**, which presupposes a **subject**.
(b) The **subject of conception** (S) is the locus of processing activity and mental experience. As such, it is "offstage" and implicit, attention being directed to a certain portion of the mental universe, called the **objective scene** (OS), or "onstage region".
(c) The **object of conception** (O) is the *focus* of attention within the objective scene. As such it is salient and usually made explicit. (As a special case, S can itself function as O.)
(d) S is said to be *subjectively construed*. O is *objectively construed*.

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

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

(15)(a) Social interaction depends on a number of individual capacities: fine discrimination of facial expressions; following the direction of another's gaze; reading another's intentions; mental simulation of another's experience.
(b) The **interactive function** of language breaks down into more specific functions: *expressiveness*, *manipulation*, and *social communion*.
(c) *Symbolization* is crucial for the **descriptive function** of language.
(d) All of these figure in its **communicative function**.

(16)(a) Certain linguistic phenomena, e.g. a cry of pain, are primarily **individual**; they *express* feelings, as opposed to *describing* them. Still, they serve the functions of communion and manipulation and are to some extent conventional.
(b) Some expressions are primarily **interactive** (e.g. *hello*, *yes*, *please*). The intent is to elicit a response (a verbal one, a non-verbal action, or a change in mental/emotive state).
(c) Minimally, the speaker expects the listener to attend to what is said and apprehend it in accordance with the conventions of the language (**baseline response**).
(d) The **descriptive** function incorporates the interactive function and the baseline response. By symbolic means, the speaker focuses the hearer's attention on a particular element in the objective scene—the expression's **profile**. This momentary alignment in the scope and focus of attention is a basic component of intersubjectivity.

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

S = speaker
H = hearer
G = ground
OS = objective scene
F = focus of attention
MS = maximal scope

(18)(a) The **canonical arrangement** (though maybe not the most *frequent*) is for the ground and the objective scene to be basically distinct (e.g. *the cat*; *She bought an iPhone*).

(b) Even then, the interlocutors and their interaction have a significant role in an expression's linguistic meaning. They are part of the supporting **conceptual substrate**.

(c) Minimally, a unit's import includes the tacit recognition that it is used by speakers of the language, as a matter of established convention, in certain kinds of contexts.

(d) Non-canonical arrangements, where G and OS overlap, are frequent and unproblematic. Alternate ways of dealing with the overlap result in subtly different meanings.

(19)

(a) *she*



(b) *I* (exploded)



(c) *I* (collapsed)



(d) *you* (collapsed)



(e) *She saw him.*



(f) *I see you*. (exploded)



(g) *I see you*. (collapsed)



(20)(a) Although the speaker and hearer are subjects of conception, the pronouns *I* and *you* construe them objectively. Each interlocutor mentally simulates the other's experience (intersubjectivity) and is an object of conception from that standpoint.

(b) A pronoun profiles a **thing** (specifically a person). A verb or a clause profiles a **relationship** (specifically a **process**, i.e. a relationship tracked through time).

(21)(a) **Speech act:** An expression's interactive force (e.g. statement, question, promise, order).
(b) As a facet of the ground, speech act force is commonly left implicit (*I will leave*). As part of the objective scene, it is described by verbs like *state*, *ask*, *promise*, and *order*.
(c) In a **performative**, describing a speech act serves to perform it: *I order you to leave*.
(d) With **imperatives**, the speech act force is left offstage. The hearer can be construed objectively, as actor (*You leave!*), or else subjectively, as interlocutor (*Leave!*). Only the latter allows the intersubjective *please*: *Please leave*, but not **You leave, please!*.

(22)

(a) *She ordered him to leave.*



(b) *I order you to leave.*



(c) *You leave!*



(d) *Leave!*



Description

Symbolization

(23)(a) **Symbolization** is the *conventional association* of a *meaning* and a *form*.
(b) Its **semantic pole** is a conception (along any axis) to be conveyed linguistically.
(c) Its **phonological pole** is anything whose overt manifestation provides an observable basis for symbolic interaction (sounds, gesture, facial expression, body language, writing).

(24)(a) An expression (of any size) is a **symbolic assembly** consisting of *semantic structures*, *phonological structures*, and *symbolic associations* between them.
(b) Assemblies are **dynamic**, consisting in processing activity occurring in different domains, on different time scales, and at different levels of structure.
(c) They exhibit both **seriality** and **hierarchy** as co-existing dimensions of organization.

(25)(a) *The cat is in my bedroom, in the closet, in a box, on a blanket.*
(b) *The cat is on a blanket, in a box, in the closet, in my bedroom.*

(26)(a) **Grammatical constituency** emerges in assemblies when *component* symbolic structures are integrated to form *composite* symbolic structures of greater complexity.
(b) In CG, constituency is neither essential nor fundamental. It is variable, sometimes fails to emerge, and is never exhaustive of grammatical structure.

Conceptual Semantics

(27)(a) Meaning is identified with **conceptualization**, which can be characterized negatively as *not* being either insular, static, self-contained, objective, or mysterious.
(b) Rather than being self-contained, an expression's meaning emerges from a **conceptual substrate** on which it depends and from which it cannot be clearly separated.
(c) Linguistic meaning is not **objective** in the sense of directly reflecting the world's actual nature. It depends on the **subject** of conception, who **construes** it in a certain manner. Much of what we describe is **imaginative** and far removed from objective reality.
(d) Rather than being mysterious, conceptualization is subject to empirical investigation. It can be described explicitly in terms of a specific set of descriptive notions.

(28)(a) An expression's conceptual substrate consists of **cognitive domains**: any range of conceptual potential, any concept (simple or complex), or any body of knowledge.
(b) **Basic domain:** A basic aspect of experience that is not itself a concept but creates the potential for concepts to emerge (e.g. space, time, the range of perceivable colors).
(c) **Non-basic domains** are concepts of any degree of complexity. Some function as parts of others (e.g. LINE > ANGLE > RIGHT ANGLE > SQUARE > RED SQUARE). This can happen at many levels, producing conceptions of indefinite complexity.
(d) A conception at any level in such a hierarchy is a domain which may be invoked as the basis for an expression's meaning (e.g. the concept of a building for *roof*, overall knowledge of basketball for *free throw*).

(29)(a) Most expressions invoke multiple domains. For *square*: SPACE, LINE, FOUR, ANGLE, RIGHT ANGLE, STRAIGHTNESS, PARALLELISM, LENGTH, EQUALITY (of length), CONTACT (coincidence of endpoints), ENCLOSURE.
(b) The domains invoked are connected in various ways, e.g. inclusion (LINE > ANGLE > RIGHT ANGLE), overlap (STRAIGHTNESS, PARALLELISM, and LENGTH all involve the conception of a line), and association (EQUALITY pertains to length).
(c) Expressions are not "containers" for meaning, but provide a dynamic means of **accessing** conceptual structures that for the most part are established independently. There is no definite boundary between "linguistic" and "extra-linguistic" knowledge.

(30)(a) The conceptual structures we describe linguistically are often produced by **imaginative** capacities, hence they depart from **actuality** (the world as it *actually is*).
(b) The conception functioning as *object of description* may thus be far removed from "objective reality", being **mentally constructed** by the conceptualizing *subject*.
(c) In **mental simulation**, processing activity is **disengaged** from its original supporting context and occurs independently (e.g. visual and motor imagery; memory).
(d) Patterns of disengaged activity can be combined into new composite conceptions (e.g. imagined objects, projected future events, simulation of another person's experience).

(31)(a) **Mental spaces** are separate "working areas", each hosting a conceptual structure representing some facet of an overall conception.
(b) Spaces are connected by *correspondences* between component elements.
(c) The *configuration* of the spaces, and the *function* of each within it, are crucial.

(32)(a) Counterfactual conditional: *If he were rich, Jill would marry him.*
(b) Belief space: *Jill thinks he's rich, but Alice suspects that he isn't.*
(c) Desire space: *Jill wants to marry an actor. He {is / has to be} rich.*

(33)

(a) Specific



(b) Non-specific



(34) A **virtual** (or **fictive**) entity is "conjured up" for a particular local purpose and has no status outside the special mental space serving this function.
(a) *If I had **a cat**, I would feed **it** tuna.*
(b) *He has **several missing teeth**.*
(c) ***An elephant** has **a trunk**.*
(d) ***Each girl** was holding **a rose**.*

(35)



(36)(a) **Metaphor** consists in correspondences between a *source domain* and a *target domain*.
(b) In **blending**, selected elements of two *input spaces* are projected into a third space and integrated (along with other content) to form a *blend* with emergent properties.
(c) In both phenomena, cognitive domains are connected to one another and provide the conceptual substrate invoked by expressions as the basis for their meaning.

(37)(a) THOUGHTS ARE OBJECTS: *We tossed around some ideas.*
(b) UNDERSTANDING IS PHYSICAL CONTROL: *He couldn't grasp what I was saying.*
(c) EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS: *I couldn't put my thoughts into words.*
(d) COMMUNICATION IS SENDING: *She finally managed to get her idea across to me.*
(e) MEANING IS A SUBSTANCE: *I could get very little out of what he said.*
(f) SENTENCES ARE CONSTRUCTED OBJECTS: *Bush can't even put a sentence together.*

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

(39) *If men had babies, birth control and abortion would be freely available.*



Construal

(40)(a) **Construal** is our ability to conceive and portray the same situation in alternate ways.
(b) An expression's meaning depends on both the conceptual content invoked (the domains comprising its substrate) and the construal imposed on that content. Expressions with the same content are semantically distinct because they construe it differently [(25)].
(c) Some dimensions of construal: *selection*, *prominence*, *perspective*, *dynamicity*.

(41)(a) *The glass is half-empty* vs. *The glass is half-full*.
(b) **Metonymy:** *China was just three weeks. He was shot and buried in a shallow grave.*
(c) **Specificity:** *something → an object → a box → a purple box → a big purple box → a gigantic purple box → a gigantic purple box decorated with large red squares*

(42)(a) An expression's **profile** is the *intersubjective focus of attention* within the objective scene: the entity it **designates**—or **refers to**—in this conceptual context (the **base**).
(b) Expressions with the same content can differ in meaning due to profiling.
(c) Either a **thing** (grouping) or a **relationship** (connections) can be profiled.

(43)

(a) *roof*

(b) *day*



(c) *parent*



(d) *child*



(e) *on*



(f) *tall*



(g) *approach*



(h) *admire*



(i) *above*



(j) *below*



(k) *before*



(l) *after*



(44)(a) The **trajector** (tr) of a profiled relationship is its *primary focal participant*, made prominent as the entity being characterized. A *secondary focal participant*, invoked for this purpose, is called a **landmark** (lm). [***The cat*** (tr) *is on* ***a blanket*** (lm).]

(b) Expressions with the same content and the same profile can differ semantically in this respect, e.g. *above* vs. *below*, *before* vs. *after*, *like* vs. *please*, or an active (*Jack admires Jill*) vs. a passive (*Jill is admired by Jack*).

(45)(a) *Perspective* includes such factors as **vantage point** and **orientation**.

(b) Manifestations of *dynamicity* include **sequence of mental access** [(25)] and **fictive change**. [*broken line* (cf. *broken vase*); *scattered villages* (cf. *scattered marbles*)]

(46) *In this picture of Barack and Michelle, …*

(a) *Michelle is on the left.*



(b) *Michelle is on his left.*



(c) *Michelle is on his right.*



Lexicon

(47)(a) **Lexicon** comprises the *fixed expressions* of a language—overtly manifested symbolic structures that are both entrenched as *units* and *conventional* in a speech community.
(b) Not every word is a lexical item, e.g *desolidify* (= 'melt'), and many larger expressions are, e.g. *go to the store*.
(c) Typical lexical items are **descriptive** (and thus have a profile). Also included in lexicon are expressions pertaining to the other axes: individual (*Ow!, Ouch!*), interactive (*hello*, *yes*), and discursive (***So*** *what are you doing tonight?*).
(d) Every expression has import with respect to all four axes. [*urinate ≠ pee ≠ piss*]

(48)(a) A lexeme affords conventional yet flexible access to the domains providing its content. It may have a slightly different semantic value in every use.
(b) *She picked a* ***cucumber*** *and threw it at him.*
(c) *There's too much* ***cucumber*** *in this salad.*
(d) *The Chinese banquet featured sea* ***cucumber****.*

(49)(a) Common lexical items are **polysemous**, having multiple **senses**. To some extent these form a *network* based on categorizations of recognition (S→T) or extension (S--->T).
(b) A network usually centers on a **prototype**, which is prominent and activated by default.
(c) Though valid and useful up to a point, the network model is overly discrete.
(d) An alternative metaphorical model, that of a MOUNTAIN RANGE, implies a continuous field of potential while recognizing that certain regions are more salient than others.

(50) *cat*



(51) *How many cats do you have?*
(a) *Three, including a kitten.*
(b) *Three, but one is only a kitten.*
(c) *Three, but I also have a lion.*
(d) **Three, but one is a {whip / jazz musician / twin-hulled boat}.*

(52)(a) Lexical items occur in particular structural contexts. Being abstracted from usage events, they incorporate any recurring features of those contexts.
(b) One aspect of a lexeme's characterization is thus a set of **structural frames**.
[*like* [NML]] (*She likes fancy cars*.) [*like* [*to* V]] (*She likes to party*.)
(c) Frames specify a lexeme's **distribution**. Conversely, a **distributional class** consists of the lexemes that share a frame. This illustrates the lexicon-grammar continuum.
[*like* [*to* V]], [*want* [*to* V]], [*try* [*to* V]], [*expect* [*to* V]], [*prepare* [*to* V]], etc.

Grammar

(53)(a) Grammar exists because lexicon is insufficient for the **descriptive function** of language.
(b) Grammar is symbolic, hence all grammatical elements are **meaningful**.
(c) Its meaning is **schematic**, consisting mainly in the *construal* imposed on lexical content.

(54)(a) Fundamental grammatical notions (e.g. noun, verb, subject, object, possessive) can be characterized semantically in terms of both a **prototype** and a general **schema**.
(b) **Prototypes:** *physical object* (N), *force-dynamic event* (V), *human agent* (SUBJ), *inanimate patient* (OBJ), *ownership* (POSS). [*He broke my cup*.]
(c) Schematic characterizations rely on **basic cognitive abilities**. Independent of any specific conceptual content, these abilities make possible, and are initially manifested in, the corresponding prototypes.
(d) **Schemas:** *thing* (N), *process* (V), *trajector* (SUBJ), *landmark* (OBJ), *reference point relationship* (POSS).

(55)(a) **Entity:** A maximally general term, for anything one might need to refer to for analytic purposes (thing, relationship, location, direction, region on a scale, etc.). It need not be discrete, salient, or individually recognized.
(b) **Grouping:** Apprehending multiple entities as a single entity for higher-level purposes.
(c) **Thing:** Any product of grouping (hence effectively a single entity).
(d) Through connecting operations, we establish **relationships** among conceived entities.
(e) A **process** is a relationship tracked in its evolution through time.

(56)



(57)(a) An expression's grammatical category depends on its **profile**, not its overall content.
(b) A *noun* profiles a **thing**. A *verb* profiles a **process**.
(c) *Adjectives*, *prepositions*, and *adverbs* profile **non-processual relationships**.

(58)

(a) *husband* (b) *wife* (c) *throw* (d) *thrower*



(59)

(a) Preposition (b) Adjective (c) Adverb (d) *fast* (ADV) (e) *fast* (ADJ)



(60)(a) **Constructions** are patterns for combining simpler expressions into more complex ones.
(b) Complex expressions are **assemblies** of (phonologically) specific symbolic structures.
(c) Any patterns they follow consist in otherwise analogous symbolic assemblies some or all of whose elements are schematic rather than specific: **constructional schemas**.
(d) Once abstracted, constructional schemas can be used in constructing and assessing new expressions on the same pattern, i.e. for **coding**.

(61)

(a)



(b)



(62)(a) In a typical construction, **component** and **composite** symbolic structures are **integrated**, semantically and phonologically, to form a **composite** symbolic structure.
(b) Their integration is effected by **correspondences** between certain elements within them.
(c) It is usual for one component to contain a schematic **elaboration site** (**e-site**) that the other specifies in finer detail. The e-site (shaded) corresponds to the latter's profile.
(d) It is also usual for one component to impose its profile on the composite whole. This component (heavy-line box) is called the **profile determinant**.
(e) The phonological integration of components **symbolizes** their semantic integration.
(f) Correspondences and profile determinance are aspects of **constructional meaning**: they reflect the constructional schema instead of the meaning of either component.
(g) The composite structure arising at one level of organization often functions as a component structure in a higher-level construction, resulting in **constituency**.

(63)



(64)(a) Constituency is not per se essential, but merely one form symbolic assembles can assume. It is flexible, variable, and non-exhaustive of grammatical organization.

(b) Basic grammatical notions are characterized in terms of meaning and semantic function.

(c) A **subject** is a nominal that specifies the *trajector* of a profiled relationship. An **object** is one that specifies the *landmark* of such a relationship.

(65)

(a)



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

Discourse

(66)

(a)



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

(67)(a) In discourse, content is presented in successive *windows of attention*.
(b) Processing occurs simultaneously at different levels of organization, in windows on different time scales, and with different degrees of salience.
(c) Content in multiple windows can be related within a larger *scope of awareness*.
(d) Grammatical and discourse structure form a continuum. "Syntactic" relationships can be seen as discursive relationships on smaller time scales.

(68)(a) ***Melissa*** *left before Bill could talk to* ***her***.
(b) ***Melissa*** *left early. That was unfortunate, since Bill wanted to talk to* ***her***.

(69)

(a) *she* (descriptive)



(b) *she* (discursive)



(70)(a) A lexical noun or verb merely specifies a thing or process **type**. A full nominal ("noun phrase") or a full ("finite") clause designates a particular **instance** of the specified type.
(b) **Grounding:** The intersubjective process of singling out a thing or process instance as nominal or clausal referent by indicating its position or status in our mental universe.
(c) Grounding involves a **path of mental access** the interlocutors follow in order to "reach" the referent. This **target** (T) is accessible via some **reference point** (R).
(d) Coreference (e.g. *she*) is the special case where R and T coincide. R can also be some facet of the ground: *this dog* is the one accessible via the speaker (based on proximity).
(e) **Possessives** (e.g. *Melissa's dog*) are grounding elements. Possession is described schematically as a reference point relation between possessor (R) and possessed (T).

(71)

(a) *Melissa's dog*



(b) *Bill's friend's sister's lawyer*



(c)



(72)(a) As a basic mental capacity with little intrinsic content, access via reference points is often implicit, an aspect of *constructional meaning*.

(b) *jakare ruguai* [crocodile tail] 'the crocodile's tail' [Guaraní]

(c) Like possessives, **topic** constructions are based on *reference point relationships*, with a thing as reference point (R). They differ in their targets (T): thing vs. process.

(d) Topics can be marked explicitly (e.g. Japanese *wa*) or merely by juxtaposition of R and T.

(e) There are topics at different levels of organization (e.g. external or internal to a clause).

(73)

(a)



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

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